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CURRENT COMMENr
UNITED STATES v. SCHWIMMER
ERNST FREUND

IN this case' a woman, a well-known pacifist, was denied naturalization as an American citizen. The Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Butler (Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Sandford dissenting)
says: "The burden was upon her to show what she meant and that her
pacifism and lack of nationalistic sense did not oppose the principle
that it is a duty of citizenship by force of arms, when necessary, to
defend the country against all enemies, and that her opinions and beliefs would not prevent or impair the true faith and allegiance required
by the act. She failed to do so. The District Court was bound by the
law to deny her application."
The decision deserves careful study.
Note that the court says: "The District Court was bound by the
law to deny her application." In other words, the reason for the decision was not that the District Court exercised a fair discretion with
which the Circuit Court of Appeals should not have interfered. That
would have been a conceivable position but not a desirable one. It is
better that naturalization should be controlled by law than by discretion, nd those who applauded the Circuit Court of Appeals, when
it reversed the District Court, cannot consistently criticize the Supreme Court merely for treating the whole matter as one of statutory
right or disability.
The question then is: Was Mrs. Schwimmer judged according to
the standards laid down by the statute?
Her rejection must be placed upon one of two grounds (or the two
combined): the one relating to the oath of allegiance; the other to the
statutory requirements concerning character, attachment, and disposition.
The required oath is to the effect that the applicant will support
and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the
same. It is prescribed for applicants of both sexes and of ages however
advanced; it must, therefore, be possible for women of fifty or men of
seventy to take it. Mrs. Schwimmer was willing and ready to take the
oath, and thought she could take it. Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion says that it is agreed that she is qualified except s6 far as
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her views may show ".
. that she cannot take the oath of allegiance without a mental reservation." The quotation marks are
Justice Holmes'. But I cannot find the words in the prevailing opinion.
To permit an inquiry into mental reservations would be to set official
conjecture above the law. The Supreme Court has done no sUch thing.
The oath of allegiance may be laid out of the case.
The Supreme Court denies the right to citizenship because the
applicant's conceded views as to the bearing of arms in defense of the
country show that she is not attached to the principles of the Constitution or well disposed to the good order or happiness of the country.
What is legal evidence of the lack of these attributes? It might be
a plausible answer to say that the best and conclusive evidence is found
in a refusal to obey laws, and the Supreme Court seems to think that
Mrs. Schwimmer fails by that test. Does she? She has not violated
any law. Congress did in 1917 relieve from the selective draft members
of religious organizations objecting to combatant service; for all we
know Congress may in the next war exempt all conscientious objectors. To test law-abidingness by reference to non-e'isting laws lands us
in speculation. As well ask an applicant: would you in 1850 have
obeyed the Fugitive Slave law? The criterion of obedience to imaginary
laws would open the doors to all kinds of arbitrariness. Fortunately,
again, the Supreme Court has not committed itself to that criterion.
There remains, then, as the sole ground of the decision the inconsistency between opposition to bearing arms in the defense of the country and attachment to the principles of the Constitution. Suppose it is
true that there are many citizens who hold Mrs. Schwimmer's views
and who are as much entitled to their citizenship as the Judges of the
Supreme Court: has not Congress applied a different test to those not
yet citizens, which the courts must apply and, in order to apply, must
interpret according to the best of their ability? Mr. Justice Holmes
calls attention to the Eighteenth Amendment and those not attached
to its principles. He might also have called attention to the difficulties
of those who do not find themselves attached to the principles of the
Constitution established by the many five-to-four decisions of the
Supreme Court. If Mr. Justice Butler has the courage of his convictions, he is bound to declare all of them unworthy to be called citizens,
for surely he would not claim power of discrimination between principles and principles, but, confronted with the embarrassments of pressing devotion to principles to logical conclusions, would shield himself
behind the mandate of the statute: "ita lex scripta."
Let us then examine the letter of the statute,--in too many cases,
alas, the last thing that lawyers think of doing. Do we find that Congress set up so elusive and impossible a test for judicial administration
as an abstract attitude of attachment to constitutional principles that
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may mean anything or nothing? The law is to the effect that the applicant during the last five years must have behaved as a man of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States. Congress, then, it appears was content to abide by the
relatively practicable test of actual conduct, and there is no statutory
authority to go beyond that.
Mr. Justice Holmes refers to the Eighteenth Amendment. A
Federal Court once refused naturalization to a resident of El Paso,
who ran a saloon across the border line in Mexico; that at least was
capable of being construed as conduct showing lack of attachment to
the principles of the Constitution. Had Mrs. Schwimmer between 1921
and 1926 conducted herself as a propagandizing pacifist, that should
have been shown, and it would have been possible to judge what a
person must do or avoid doing to behave as a person attached to the
principles of the Constitution; but as to that, the opinion is silent. It
goes without saying that a truthful answer to an official question concerning opinion cannot be distorted into a form of behavior. The difference between conduct and opinion as a qualification test is elementary and fundamental; it is recognized by Congress (opinion being made
a test only in the case of disbelief in organized government), while it is
overlooked or ignored by the Supreme Court. The decision should
make a stronger appeal to militant patriots than to careful lawyers.
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THE sinking of the Canadian vessel, the rvm Alone, has provoked
an amazing amount of popular interest, in addition to the speculation
on the part of international lawyers. The Canadian and American
governments having failed to reach an agreement through correspondence, the problem will be referred to an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1924 with Great Britain.1
The rm Alone was hailed, it is claimed,2 at a point some 102 miles
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'The treaty may be found in U. S. TREATY SEr 685; or in (1924) Au. J. IT-r.
LAw 127. The tribunal provided is the Claims Commissioa set up by the agreement

of 1910.
2

The facts are taken from the correspondence exchanged between Canada and

the United States. State Department Press Release, April 25, 1929; found also

(in full) in the New York Herald Tribune for April 26.
Evidence is in conflict as to the distance from shore. The United States seem to

have the better of this argument, for her claim is based upon the calculations of
expert navigators, and supported by an impartial witness.
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